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Abstract
Many international women’s rights treaties have been adopted and ratified in the
years since the closing of World War II. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations in
1979, and has been ratified by all but six states parties. Women all over the world
continue to endure mistreatment and inequality, despite multiple international efforts,
such as CEDAW, to improve conditions on their behalf. This thesis aims to analyze
possible ulterior incentives for the ratification of women’s rights treaties, motivated by
the alarming disconnect between rhetoric and action put forth by individual states. I
examine and collect data for various indicators chosen to represent the conditions for
women in various aspects of life within states who have ratified CEDAW. This data set
is then compared with data collected from states who have not ratified CEDAW, in order
to determine whether it is reasonable to assume women’s rights treaties have a
significant impact on the likelihood of states to lower rates of gender-based abuse,
improve opportunities, and reduce gender inequality.
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Introduction
While women’s rights movements have arguably made significant progress in
many states, and specifically western states, there still exists a significant struggle for
women around the world. While countless international treaties, declarations and
conventions have formed over the last few decades in order to protect and advance the
rights of women, we are not able to identify nearly as much progress worldwide as we
should be able to reasonably expect given the scale of the promises made by almost
every member state of the United Nations. Women are still abused, oppressed,
murdered, assaulted, and discriminated against at alarmingly higher rates than men,
even in those countries which claim to support women and equality.
The question I aim to address then, is why continue announcing dedication to a
cause you have no intention of supporting? The past 100 years holds clear evidence
that our current tactics are not improving conditions for women universally or on an
international scale, despite the amount of funds, time, and resources being dedicated to
the cause. Additionally, cases remain where states refuse to ratify-+=8international
women’s rights treaties, yet claim to support equality as a fundamental pillar of their
societies, such as is the case in the United States. Additionally, why choose women to
be the recipient of such extensive discussions? I argue that there are underlying
reasons, incentives and possible ulterior motives that drive states to sign women’s
rights treaties, apart from the sole intent to improve conditions for women.
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First, I argue that international human rights treaties are largely reputational.
While the idea and purpose of women’s rights treaties is to grant equality and security
between genders, there is no guarantee that those promises will be enforced. I argue
that states sign human rights and women’s rights treaties in order to be perceived as
aligning with world trends and norms and therefore gain world favor.
Most states want to play a part in the international system. One of the most
effective ways to enhance your position in the world arena as a state is to improve your
international reputation. If other states view you as engaging in positive actions or as
supporting causes that align with their own, they are more likely to engage with you.
These engagements can take many forms such as trade agreements, the formation of
alliances or protections, or foreign aid.
Women’s rights treaties are signed as a sign to the rest of the world that their
state is on board with the direction these movements are headed, that they are
contributing to its progress, and that they care about the citizens that reside within their
jurisdiction. Whether they plan to enforce these outward claims is not of importance to
them. Compliance with international human rights obligations indicates not only a
willingness to abide by treaty agreements, but also a state committed to justice and
what the world has deemed appropriate codes of conduct.
Additionally, many of the core human rights treaties we have today came into
effect during the Cold War era. Many states viewed ratification of these treaties as
having very little consequences given the assumption that the superpowers at the time
would either support or ignore their domestic policy in reference to human rights.
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Therefore, this time period encourages states to endorse human rights principles
without actually having to implement any changes in practice domestically
(Hafner-Burton). That being said, this ability to commit to a treaty without fearing heavy
enforcement also allowed for states to begin hiding domestic practices under the veil of
international law. During this time period, states began using women rights, the
participation of women, and equality as a means of democracy promotion itself. One of
the main aspects of democracy is that it serves the people, and listens to the voices of
society. In theory, you cannot have a sound democracy without popular control, and
therefore listening to all citizen voices. It would not be logical nor legitimate to attempt to
spread democracy to other states if you are not allowing equal participation and
granting equal protection for all of your own citizens. Women’s rights treaties have
become a way for world powers and developed states such as the United States to
create an image of equality and participation among all of their people, in order to
promote their agendas in other states.
As for developing countries, signing and ratifying international women’s rights
treaties has become a signal to other states that they are willing to comply (or at least
appear to comply) with whatever is deemed necessary in order to maintain their
relationships with other states. Many of these states rely on the economies of world
powers, as well as relying on foreign aid, trade deals, and formal alliances. By signing
women’s rights treaties, developing states are complying with the democratic value of
equality, and therefore can maintain and reap benefits of countries who are able to
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provide them with such things. Given the current rate of abuse and inequality women
still suffer, whether they uphold these treaties or not is not of concern.
States cannot function without the participation of women, both at the state level,
and at a personal level. Societies need women to drive economic growth, fill job
positions that men cannot (or refuse to) occupy, as well as fulfill the traditional roles of
mother and caregiver. Women’s rights treaties have become the perfect “scapegoat” to
show that they are supporting the women within their borders, therefore ensuring that
women remain satisfied by the “progress” states are making on behalf of women and
increasing the likelihood of women to remain productive members of society and
contributing to the furthering of their economic goals. Because women’s rights treaties
have proven to be generally unenforceable, states have nothing to lose and do not need
to worry about being held accountable for these bold statements of alliance with
women. Instead, they are able to continue exploiting women for all they are able to give,
while continuing to turn a blind eye to the mistreatment women continue to face.
While imposing gender quotas and other parameters for ensuring equal
opportunity for women has helped progress in the role that women play in decision
making processes, women still suffer remarkably in almost every other sector of society.
If states actually cared about women’s issues, women’s health, and women’s safety, we
would be able to see progress in all of these sectors, and not just an increase in political
participation.
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Literature Review:

International human rights were largely brought to the spotlight after World War
II, motivated by the destruction the war had caused. As a result, the United Nations laid
the foundation for the first concerted effort to protect the rights of all people. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed in 1948, was among the first of its kind
(Wotipka, 2008). However, there has been a disconnect between the language set forth
in these treaties, and the actual progress being made on the ground, specifically within
the context of women's rights treaties. Given the fact that some ratifiers of women’s right
treaties actually have worse human rights records than non-ratifiers, it is reasonable to
question the motive behind the acceptance of these treaties (Spence, 2014). It has
been argued that states have used these international treaties for many underlying
reasons, other than the sole purpose of advancing equal rights among their citizens,
specifically in the case of women’s rights.
While women’s rights in many countries around the world have clearly made
significant progress, women still face remarkable discrimination and suffering on an
everyday basis. If governments truly cared about the rights of women, it would be
reasonable to expect that rates of abuses against women would be in sharp decline,
specifically after the signing of such women’s rights treaties such as Convention on the
Elimintion of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. Decades
after both CEDAW, and even longer after the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights, violence against women still remains a problem across every corner of the world

Pseudo-Protections for Women: An Analysis of Possible Ulterior Motives for Ratifying International Women’s Rights
Treaties
9

(Cooper, 1999). The WHO states that women between the ages of 15 and 44 are more
likely to die or be disabled as a result of violence than as a result of cancer, malaria,
traffic accidents or even war (Cooper, 1999). Additionally, human trafficking has
become an issue that does not just impact individual states, since transactions can
often take place across international borders. According to the State Department, close
to 2 million women and girls are trafficked every year for the purpose of forced labor or
sexual exploitation (Cooper, 1999).
Additionally, protection of women’s rights such as the right to adequate
reproductive health has not been a priority for governments, as reflected by the laws
they have created domestically. Paternalistic control of women’s sexual and
reproductive behavior continues to manifest itself in laws and policies within domestic
societies. According to the World Health Organization, it is estimated that 500,000
women die from pregnancy-related causes and 25-50% of maternal deaths are caused
by unsafe abortions (Cook, 2003). This is a solvable issue- if governments really wanted
to protect women, they would be working to grant them access to family planning
services, contraception, and access to safe procedures that could dramatically lower
this rate and keep thousands of women alive.
While political rights secure an individual’s participation in democracy and
political decisions, social rights are known to protect economic welfare and security, and
are essential for guaranteeing the effective use of these political rights. Many western
industrialized democracies have made significant progress in formal promotion of
equality between men and women. This is evident in instances of increased
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representation of women within legislatures since the 1970s. That being said, it is still
important to recognize the difference between perceived equality and true unconditional
equality, seeing as though women still continue to have less social, political, and civil
power (Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2009). Additionally, because of a lack of cultural support or
domestic enforcement of these rights that are granted and recognized by international
women’s rights treaties, these rights become worth little to women. If there are no duties
on the part of domestic governments, organizations, or individuals to respect these
rights, then violations will go unrecognized and unremedied (Cook, 2003).
If women’s rights treaties were a sign that governments were ready to protect
women, we should see femicide rates dropping as well. However, in 1999, decades
after the adoption of CEDAW, the number of men killed by their female partners has
dropped by more than two-thirds, to around 400 a year, since the mid-1970s, while the
number of women killed as a result of domestic violence has remained high, at more
than 1,000 a year (Cooper, 1999).
With all of these issues still perpetrating the daily lives of women, it is reasonable
to assume ulterior motives to states signing these women’s rights treaties. One theory
as to why states sign these treaties, regardless of their concern for women is to
enhance their reputation among the international arena. According to Zartner, states will
comply with international treaties for a number of reasons, one being that states may
face pressure from other states and thus feel as though they must uphold their
reputation by following suit. Reputation is defined as intangible attributes of a state,
such as fairness, reliability, and a desire to follow “the rules of the game” from which
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other states can form expectations about future interactions with that state. Most states
want to play a role in the international system, and one way to enhance their position is
by drawing on their international reputation. (Zartner, 2010). One theory of how states
adopt certain international norms is the “theory of appropriateness,” in which a state
becomes convinced that a certain behavior is necessary for any actor claiming
statehood. These norms often take the form of treaty commitments which show other
states that the ratifier is a legitimate member of the international community (Spence,
2014).
Furthermore, the system surrounding global human rights has offered
governments strong incentives to ratify treaties as a matter of “window dressing”, and
demands no serious commitment to the implementation of these practices
(Hafner-Burton, 2005). Often, states respond to this international or regional pressure
with cosmetic veils rather than substantive reforms to protect women (Alaimo, 2016).
These concessions are commonly made by governments in an attempt to signal to
other states that the regime recognizes and supports human rights, but traditionally
have done little in regards to policy change (Ryckman, 2016). Generally, governments
have reputational incentives to ratify treaties they have neither the means nor the
intention to implement (Hafner-Burton, 2005).
Countries may also sign treaties as a means of seeking financial capital or more
material assistance from other states. In cases of emerging democracies, states want to
demonstrate their commitment to human rights as well as their democratic credentials.
These countries are often more vulnerable to outside pressure than wealthier states or
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democracies that are already established (Htun, Mala, and S. Laurel Weldon, 2010).
Overall, it is generally agreed upon that one of the best ways for states to enhance their
standing in the international arena is through compliance with international human rights
norms. These norms have become a key component of modern statehood, and a
growing indicator of commitment to principles of justice and appropriate codes of
conduct (Zartner, 2010). Additionally, international agreements have served as a shield
for disguising current human rights violations within their borders. These treaties make it
difficult for foreign influences to pressure states into taking further action, and can often
result in governments spiraling into further repressive practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005).
In a sense, human rights treaties have served to take the spotlight away from states
who violate human rights regularly, by ratifying similar agreements to those other states
in their geographic location (Ryckman, 2016).
Another reason states may choose to sign women’s rights treaties, other than for
the sole purpose of promoting women’s rights, is that they might not have much to
sacrifice by signing them. International treaties can only serve to monitor local practice,
and cannot actually enforce those international standards (Wotipka, 2008). Scholars
within the realist and neoliberal ideologies confirm that states largely comply with
international law when it is in their national interest to do so, not because they are
forced to do so (Hafner-Burton, 2005). The UN is not a supranational entity and does
not have the authority to mandate the compliance international law on these issues
(Bronwyn, 2006). This system, which is largely based on self-reporting, has been
criticized as the weakest form of enforcement. Furthermore, states have the ability to
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misrepresent the actual situation in their countries, for which there are no
consequences. There is also no protocol to ensure that reports are submitted either in a
timely fashion, or at all (Alaimo, 2016).
States are not ignorant to the fact that the human rights regime is not designed to
supply states with strong tools to enforce compliance. Because of this, it should not be
surprising that we see a gap between ratification and actual behavior (Hafner-Burton,
2005). Often, states use their sovereignty as an excuse to violate UN treaties and as a
defense against foreign intervention and pressure (Bronwyn, 2006). There continues to
be a gap between states’ tendency to join these treaties, and the actual incorporation of
these practices into domestic law. This brings into question the authenticity of claims to
protect the lives of their citizens (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Laws protecting women’s health
are largely lacking in many states, and where they do exist, they are rarely or
inadequately enforced (Cook, 2003). Women may find it hard to make claims within
both the national or international realm, and unless written into national law, they may
find that their rights are virtually unenforceable (Bronwyn, 2006).
That being said, another variable that may influence not only the ratification of a
treaty, but the actual implementation of its practices is domestic politics and ideologies.
Most scholarship on treaties fails to account for the domestic political conflict that treaty
ratification raises (Baldez, 2015). Not only does current international law uphold
institutions that are fundamentally patriarchal, but the status of women today largely
reflects the influence of religion and culture within states (Isaacs-Martin, 2013). Whether
states comply with the commitments they make to international treaties largely relies on
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domestic mobilization of actors supporting compliance (Hafner-Burton, 2005).
Additionally, states whose cultures align with treaty goals tend to have higher rates of
ratification. For example, countries with fewer human rights violations most likely have
citizens that value human rights principles, and therefore may be more likely to ratify
human rights treaties, since not only does the population support this, but the
government will most likely need to make few policy changes in order to comply with the
treaty (Wotipka, 2008). Women's movements play a key role in demanding those
policies. However, economic, political, and social change relies largely on cultural
heritage (Bush, 2011).
It has been found that in general, democractic regimes may be more likely to
ratify treaties based off of bottom-up domestic pressure. This is largely due to the fact
that nonviolent, pro-democracy movements are difficult to repress but threatening for
democracies to ignore. The promotion of rights and protections for marginalized or
vulnerable groups, such as women, are foundational to democratic societies (Ryckman,
2016). Because of this, I argue that states have come to use women as a symbol of
democracy itself, for the sake of democracy promotion abroad.
Equality and equal opportunity are key pillars within a democratic society. There
is understood to be a social contract within western democracies that guarantees
equality between individuals (Gordon, 1992). This emphasis on the protection from
inequality is integral for the functioning of a sound democratic system. Furthermore,
women’s rights and social rights groups continue to adhere to a democratic ideal that
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holds political institutions responsible for ensuring lower levels of inequality (Oser,
2018).
In the Western Hemisphere, the end of the Cold War presented a great
opportunity to provide greater democracy promotion abroad (Azpuru, 2010). However, a
state cannot effectively impose a democratic system in nonwestern societies if it cannot
first demonstrate a well-functioning society which upholds its own basic principles such
as equality. Democracy promotion has become important for many reasons, most of
which support the idea that democracy leads to both long-lasting domestic stability as
well as international peace (Bridoux, Jeff, and Milja Kurki, 2014). The promotion of
gender equality has become a key aspect of international democracy promotion (Bush,
2011). It has become clear that rising levels of inequality could have an effect on the
way citizens view their political system. The liveliness of women’s organizations have
become an important indicator of how well democratic institutions are functioning.
Women’s roles in legislatures and increased political participation contributes to
sustainability of healthy democratic institutions, as well as democratic political culture
(Pospieszna, 2014). If the democratic system fails to provide this social protection for
all, it does not live up to normative standards of democracy, and therefore can
negatively affect democratic legitimacy (Oser, 2018). Many say that benefits of
democracy promotion include creating more stable international arenas and
environments, which fosters stronger economies. Others argue that democracy
promotion is just another form of modern imperialism, and can bind regional allies to
donor states, with the threat of withdrawal for noncompliance.
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While democracy promotion may explain why developed countries choose to
sign women’s rights treaties, the answer for why developing countries or nondemocratic
states decide to sign these treaties tends to be quite different. Many developing
countries rely heavily on foreign aid and investments. That being said, developing
countries may sign women’s rights treaties as a way to signal to western democracies
that they are willing to follow along with global norms. One theory of how these norms
develop is called the “logic of consequences,” in which other states and third party
actors such as large corporations or NGOs reward certain states through investment,
trade, foreign aid, and political relationships or alliances (Nielsen, 2014). Constructivists
suggest that world powers or hegemonic states sometimes use material sanctions and
incentives to encourage others to adopt new international norms (Spence, 2014).
Nielson also describes pressure from western states, with the threat of aid or
other benefits, as the first reason that developing states ratify human rights and
women’s rights treaties. Potential ratifying states view this as a low cost transaction,
since most women’s right treaties are very loosely enforced, largely symbolic, and in
turn they can expect to receive substantial material benefits (Spence, 2014). The more
a developing country can adopt democratic ideals and norms such as gender equality
into its reputation, the more foeign aid it can be guaranteed to receive.
The last twenty to twenty-five years of the twentieth century saw a massive
increase in the international networks and global agreements on women’s rights. These
networks have been developed to place pressure on governments, raise awareness
and share resources and ideas across borders (Htun, Mala, and S. Laurel Weldon,
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2010). Growing interconnectedness of this movement across nations has fostered
opportunities and resources for women’s rights to expand, making it almost impossible
for governments to ignore (Tsutsui, 2006). International human rights law has become
somewhat of a small aspect of the success of the women’s movement, yet it has still
been important for its role in enabling the movement to grow and gain momentum
(Nussbaum, 2016). An important part of the discussion on how the women’s movement
has grown lies within the increasing interaction between governmental and
nongovernmental sectors (Wotipka, 2008).
International collaboration of these actors has provided women’s rights groups
with material and ideological resources that have propelled the movement throughout
the last century (Tsutsui, 2006). As a result of globalization, these global models are
increasingly impacting local politics and have had the effects of socializing states into
ratifying human rights and women’s rights treaties (Wotipka, 2008). It is also interesting
to note that human rights law lags well behind the women’s movement, and thus can be
seen as a direct result of the pressure womens advocacy networks have placed on
governments, along with the growth the movement has been capable of achieving
(Nussabaum, 2016).
Local politics continue to be impacted by international standards and norms,
which are founded and enforced by women’s groups around the world. Because of this,
domestic views of the legitimacy of social movements are largely based on these
international standards. The growing importance and relevance of social justice at the
international level has enabled activists to gain public attention and support and thus
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grow their movement (Tsutsui, 2006). Unfortunately, as we have seen, while this growth
often results in added pressure to local governments and a decreased ability for
governments to ignore women’s issues, states are easily able to sign or ratify treaties as
a means to satisfy and pacify women, without changing the policies or culture that are
subjecting women to maltreatment in the first place.
Since many findings have shown the importance and impact that international
organizations, activists, and foreign governments may have on domestic policy and
action, many citizens are starting to realize that the best way to achieve domestic
reform may be through externalizing their complaints (Alaimo, 2016). Referring back to
the issues of reputation, states ratify treaties because it is sometimes viewed as what
they are “supposed to do.” As states participate in international society, they begin to
internalize human rights norms, and use ratification of these treaties as a way to publicly
declare their support for these intergovernmental networks and citizen involvement
(Wotipka, 2008). However, domestic groups also reach out to external actors to
publicize violations in their state. (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Even when a state is not being
responsive to its citizens, activists and groups can appeal to the international political
arena to place pressure on that state. As we have seen within the contemporary
women’s movement, social movements that may lack political opportunity domestically
have been able to seize political support from outside of their borders in order to
become relevant (Tsutsui, 2006).
That being said, women’s rights advocates have also begun to mobilize around
these treaties, using emerging legitimacy surrounding human rights as the means to
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provide pressure to states to improve actual women’s rights practices (Hafner-Burton,
2005). The women’s movement has continued to expand and include wider issues, and
continues to work towards achievement even after their original goals have been met
(Tsutsui, 2006). It can be argued then, to some degree, that civil society provides the
enforcement that international human rights and women’s rights treaties lack, and can
pressure governments towards either ratification, and hopefully, compliance
(Hafner-Burton, 2005).
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Case Study: The United States and CEDAW
In deciding the extent to commit to an international treaty, or any sort of
international agreement, states must determine what costs are worth the benefits they
will gain. Under certain circumstances, international human rights laws may undermine
state sovereignty, and furthermore, even when international or international treaties are
not enforceable they tend to interfere with domestic activity (Wotipka, 2008). A great
example of this cost-benefit analysis and concern for state sovereignty is that of the
United States and their refusal to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). There are only six member-states of the UN
that have yet to ratify this treaty. The case of the United States is especially unique,
given that they are the only industrialized democracy in the world that falls into this
category (Baldez, 2014).
The United States has become known as a world leader when it comes to issues
of women’s rights and gender equality. For this reason, the failure to ratify CEDAW
comes as a shock to many around the world, seeing as though women’s rights has long
been a central part of US foreign policy (Baldez, 2014). However, these treaties offer no
material, legal, or political rewards even if practices are followed (Hafner-Burton, 2005).
CEDAW requires changes at multiple levels of domestic law, including changes in
social, institutional, and individual rights (Englehart, 2014). Since the United States
already bears the reputation of a world leader within the realm of human rights, there is
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no longer a reputational incentive from a treaty that threatens to take away their state
power or interfere with their sovereignty.
For the United States, the costs of ratification outweigh the benefits. The United
States argues that the Convention would force the country to renounce too much power
to the international community, seeing as though international treaties are intended to
have supremacy over conflicting domestic legislation or policies (Shraideh 2017).
CEDAW also goes further than many human rights treaties in the sense that it
mandates more than just changes in the public sphere. It also requires changes in the
private sphere, and to an extent, may interfere with the very culture or attitudes within a
culture that a society fosters. It claims that just changing laws to reflect that men and
women are equal on paper is not enough. CEDAW also presses for the elimination of
gender-based stereotypes that are harmful to women (Englehart, 2014). However, if the
United States truly cared about placing women’s rights at the forefront of its society, the
costs of ratification and the absence of ulterior incentives would not sway them from
adopting CEDAW into their national policies, and fighting to eliminate oppressive
institutions or cultural ideals that create barriers for women.
There has also been much domestic conflict, which has been the second source
of US reservations for ratification of CEDAW. American society is still considered largely
conservative in regards to many issues, despite being seen as a leading example of the
protection of civil rights (Shraideh, 2017). Because of disagreements between
Democrats and Republicans about the costs of ratifying the treaty, the US has still been
unable to commit fully to its cause. There has been an ongoing disagreement about the
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role of women within society that began to occur in the late 1970s (Baldez, 2014). This
partisan split and overall conservativeness has led to a reluctance to show commitment
towards the Convention since its signature (Shraideh, 2017). Most of these partisan
issues arose out of a split in ideology in the realm of women’s reproductive rights and
abortion in the 1980s, in which Democrats became known to favor women’s rights, and
Republicans began to favor socially conservative views, which opposed abortion. Many
of those who identify with the Republican Party would argue that CEDAW does not align
with American norms and values, but instead furthers the interests of solely radical
feminist ideologies (Baldez, 2014).
Since states are more likely to ratify treaties when their domestic norms and
practices align well with those outlined in a specific treaty, one should expect to see the
US ratify CEDAW, seeing as though a belief in equality is supposedly so central to
American values, as well as a belief in the US to be a world leader in the promotion of
women’s rights (Baldez, 2014). However, there is concern that CEDAW could be
interpreted to affect some issues in the United States that have recently become
increasingly sensitive, such as marriage, motherhood, and family structure (Shraideh,
2017). For example, issues of paid parental leave raises questions in other realms of
American society, such as socioeconomic inequality and class politics, in which the
United States seems less willing to address (Htun, 2010).
Surprisingly, many feminist scholars have put forth arguments stating that
campaigns for women’s legal rights are, at best, a waste of energy within the context of
national laws (Charlesworth, 1994). In general, there have been findings that confirm
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CEDAW’s positive effects on women’s political rights within ratifying states’ societies.
However, there has been less evidence proving the extent of positive effects, if any,
within women's economic or social rights and wellbeing (Englehart, 2014). Political

rights are far more public and may create the illusion of progress for women within other
sectors of their lives. However, as my findings will later show, increased political rights
and participation do not always translate into further, more personal sectors of women’s
lives.
Overall, the United States has not opted to ratify CEDAW out of fear that being
held accountable for the support of women is a promise they are not willing to keep
without guaranteed reimbursement for their work. They are afraid this commitment will
interfere with their ability to make political and economic decisions domestically, and will
counter the current cultural and ideological state of the country, as well as possibly
dilute the power for those few individuals in charge. This is a clear demonstration of how
states may only use treaties based on the incentives it may provide for them, instead of
simply for the reason the treaty has been written and the goals it aims to achieve.

1

This will be demonstrated in the results of my data collection of increased percentages of women
represented in national parliaments.
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Methods
In order to test my hypothesis, I established a set of indicators of women’s
wellbeing within society in order to determine the validity of my theory. For the purpose
of this research, I focus solely on CEDAW and compare rates of improvement between
states that have ratified CEDAW, and those that have not. If my theory is correct, and it
is true that countries sign women’s rights treaties for reasons other than solely
improving conditions and advancing rights for women, then I should find that in the
years after the ratification of CEDAW there has not been significant improvement in
these conditions, specifically in comparison to those countries who have not ratified
CEDAW.
I have chosen a set of indicators to collect data from various countries in
different regions of the world and in various stages of development who have ratified
CEDAW. These indicators should provide insight to the overall wellbeing of the women
who reside within these countries throughout the last several decades. Indicators were
chosen to represent varied sectors of life, which together may provide an overall
assessment for the well-being of the women in question including: political participation,
economic opportunity and wellbeing, access to healthcare, safety and gender-based
violence, and overall equality.
The countries who have ratified CEDAW and have been chosen for data
collection include: Poland, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Guatemala. These countries
have been chosen with geographical location in mind, as to ensure regional variety.

Pseudo-Protections for Women: An Analysis of Possible Ulterior Motives for Ratifying International Women’s Rights
Treaties
25

Countries were also chosen based on development, as development may lead to
varying results, specifically in things such as access to healthcare.
Data was then collected for each of the six non-ratifying states of CEDAW. These
include the United States, Tonga, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, and Palau. Data for
non-ratifiers was less accessible, likely due to the fact that they are not responsible for
yearly progress reports that ratifying countries are technically meant to submit, as well
as varying levels of transparency within regimes in general. Because of this, data was
not able to be collected for each non-ratifying country for each indicator, or for each
year, but data is still consistent enough to determine overall trends within this group of
non-ratifiers.
The indicators I have selected are as follows: first, I will measure the
representation of women and their political power based on the percentage of seats in
the national parliament that are held by women in ratifying countries.2 This data has
been collected from the World Bank and will be measured based on percentages from
1990, to the percentages in these countries today, to determine trends and possible
improvements. These trends will then be compared to the percentages of those
countries who have not ratified CEDAW, in order to determine whether any
improvements made were strictly as a result of ratification.
I then focus on rates of intimate partner violence or domestic violence. This data
has been collected from Our World in Data, and indicates the percentage of women
who have experienced violence by an intimate partner in the last 12 months within that

2

Graphs 1A (Ratifiers) and 1B (Non-Ratifiers)
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state. Data for these percentages will be collected every ten years beginning in 1990,
and ending with the most recent data which was collected and recorded in 2016. Again,
trends will be compared between the two groups, so as to determine whether the
mandated protections of CEDAW have had a significant effect on the percentage of
women experiencing abuse.
Next, I will examine the Women’s Economic Rights3 ratings, based off of data
collected from Our World in Data. Categories or ratings range from "0" (no economic
rights for women in law and the government tolerates a high level of discrimination) to
"3" (all or nearly all of women’s rights are guaranteed by law with the government fully
and vigorously enforcing these laws). Women’s economic rights are those defined by
the CIRI Human Rights Data project. The same caparison procedure will take place in
order to determine if CEDAW has benefitted the economic rights of women in ratifying
states.
Fourth, I turn to the Global Gender Gap Index4, which is released by the World
Economic Forum on a yearly basis and aims to capture the magnitude of the gap
between men and women in four areas: economic participation and opportunity, political
empowerment, educational attainment, and health and survival. I will be comparing their
earlier scores and rankings among other countries from the years 2007 and 2013 to
their scores from this year, 2020 and gauging whether they have improved or not, as
well as comparing these to the scores and improvements made in countries who have
not ratified CEDAW.

3
4

Graphs 2A (Ratifiers) and 2B (Non-Ratifiers)
Graphs 3A (Ratifiers) and 3B (Non-Ratifiers)
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I will also be collecting ratings based on the Gender Inequality Index , from the
United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Reports. Data will be
collected for the last few decades and compare rates of increased or decreased
inequality between ratifying countries and non ratifying countries. This measurement is
aimed at portraying the inequality within three dimensions, which include: reproductive
health, general empowerment, and the labor or job market.
Lastly, I collect data on women’s health care. Specifically, I will be using access
and use of contraceptives in women6 to indicate whether women’s health and
reproductive care has taken an increased role in these countries. Data for this indicator
has been collected from the World Bank as well as Our World in Data, and is
specifically collected for women ages 15-49. Data was only able to be collected based
on its availability, which tends to be scarce. Statistics generally ranged from 7 to 10
years apart over the last 30 to 40 years.
I have formatted all of the data into line charts, so as to show the trends of
improvement or stagnation over the years since ratification. Data is organized for each
individual indicator, and one chart is created for the ratifying states, and the
non-ratifying states. This will serve as a visual aid to demonstrate and compare the data
I have collected, and to demonstrate progress over time. I then calculate an average for
each of the two categories- ratifiers and non-ratifiers, in order to more accurately
compare the trends between them. These averages are also included on each of the
graphs.

5
6

Graphs 4A (Ratifiers) and 4B (Non-Ratifiers)
Graphs 5A (Ratifiers) and 5B (Non-Ratifiers).
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If my theory is incorrect, I should be able to see a clear indication that these
numbers and percentages have improved in the lives of women since CEDAW was
enacted within each ratifying country. This would signal that countries are indeed
following (at least to an extent) the principles of the treaty, and therefore could indicate
that the intention behind ratifying women’s rights treaties is to actually improve
conditions for women, and not primarily for other reasons such as reputation or
democracy promotion.
If my theory is incorrect, states that have ratified CEDAW should be improving
conditions for women. Even more so, states who have ratified CEDAW should be
seeing trends of improvement at significantly higher rates than those countries who
have not ratified CEDAW, due to the conditions within the treaty that would not be
mandated for non-ratifiers.
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Results
Overall, the results of my data do indicate general improvements in virtually all
segments tested. However, these improvements appear to be present in both ratifying
and non-ratifying states. At the very least, improvement within ratifying countries do not
appear to be significant enough to prove the overall concern for women’s wellbeing in
these countries, specifically when compared to non-ratifying countries.
The first and most dramatic improvement was in the data collected for the
percentage of seats in national parliaments held by women.7 There are clear trends
demonstrating the increase in the representation of women in both ratifying countries
and non-ratifying countries. For countries who have ratified CEDAW, the average
percentage of women holding seats in national parliaments was at just 7.25% in 1990.
There was an increase of 15.19%, raising that average up to 22.44% in 2019 for the
countries selected during this research. In non-ratifying countries, improvement was
also significant. In 1990, the average percentage of women represented in parliament
within these countries was a devastating 4.84%. That number raised by almost 10%,
bringing the average up to 14.73% in 2019.
The results for data collected on interpersonal violence were less hopeful,
however. Ratifying states did have a decrease in the amount of women who have
experienced interpersonal violence in the last 12 months, with the average decreasing
from 35.77% of women in 1990, to 26.51% of women in 2016. For states who have not
ratified CEDAW, the average decreased, but less so than ratifying states. In 1990, 41%

7

Graphs 1A and 1B
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of women had experienced interpersonal violence in the last year, while 37.51% of
women had still experienced violence in 2016.
Women’s Economic Rights do not seem to have improved significantly, or at all.
In states who have ratified CEDAW, the average score on a scale from 0 to 2 was a
0.75, and while a few countries have seen spikes in that score over the years, the
average in 2010 remained the same at 0.75. For countries who have not ratified
CEDAW, we are able to see a bit of a more consistent increasing trend, from an
average rating of one in 1981, to an average rating of 2 in 2011.
The fourth indicator, the Gender Inequality Index indicates very slight
improvements for both sets of data. For ratifying states, the average score decreased
from a 0.41 in 1995 to a 0.3 in 2018. For states who have not ratified, the downward
trend is not only still present, but is actually more significant than the ratifying countries.
In 1995, the average score for the countries tested was 0.59, which decreased
somewhat steadily until 2018, when the average score was a 0.41.
The results yielded by data collection for contraceptive prevalence is somewhat
hard to determine based on the lack of consistent data available for both ratifying and
non-ratifying states. However, women’s health is not only important, but is an essential
indicator of women’s wellbeing, and therefore the data has still been included in this
analysis. Data for this indicator has been collected from the World Bank. While
examining the graphs and the averages calculated on each of them, it is clear that there
has not been a consistent increase in the use of contraceptives among women either in
ratifying or non-ratifying countries. In ratifying countries, the average has increased and
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decreased in certain years, but overall has landed right around the same place, with the
average in 1983 being 54.5%, and an average of 54.3% in 2016. For non-ratifying
countries, the average has slightly increased, although their averages still remain below
those states who have ratified CEDAW. Non-ratifying states' averages have increased
from an average of 38.85 in 1993 to an average of 44.06% in 2016.

Pseudo-Protections for Women: An Analysis of Possible Ulterior Motives for Ratifying International Women’s Rights
Treaties
32

Discussion
After viewing the outcomes of my data collection, I argue the results of my
findings deem my original theory to be accurate. Given the lack of significant
improvements in ratifying countries within any of the indicators chosen, it is clear that
states have not been taking the mandates within CEDAW seriously. Additionally, where
improvements are seen, they are seen both within ratifying and non-ratifying countries,
indicating that whatever improvements are being made are likely happening for reasons
other than international women’s rights treaties such as CEDAW.
Additionally, where rates have improved, it has not been significant. For example,
the percentage of women represented in parliament has improved most drastically out
of the five indicators. However, it is worth noting and acknowledging that the highest
average for either ratifying states or non-ratifying states is merely 22.44%, less than a
quarter, meaning women still hold far less political power within these societies. While
the average has indeed increased, if states were ratifying women’s rights treaties for the
sole purpose of improving wellbeing for women, which includes increasing political
opportunity and activism in government and politics, than the number of women
involved in national parliaments should more accurately portray the ratio of women to
men within that society, most likely closer to 50%.
It is also important to note that national parliaments are very public and
well-monitored institutions both on a domestic and an international level. Other
indicators, such as interpersonal violence, are generally more difficult to monitor,
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control, and prevent, due to the private nature of the abuses. That being said, adding
women to national parliaments may have less to do with the ratification of women’s
rights treaties, and more to do with upholding a state’s reputation and adhering to
international norms, as was argued earlier in this analysis.
One indicator which may clearly disprove the level of functionality of women’s
rights treaties is the data on women’s economic rights. Within countries who have
ratified CEDAW, women’s economic rights have not made significant or consistent
improvements or progress in this sector. However, the small improvements for the
countries who have not ratified CEDAW show that it is not treaties themselves that are
motivating states to make improvements for women. If treaties were driving states to
improve economic rights for women, we should expect to see the opposite- that is,
increased rights and opportunities for women within states who have ratified CEDAW,
and possible stagnation within states who have not ratified CEDAW.
Additionally, seeing as though these improvements were not consistent with
either ratifying or non-ratifying states across all five indicators, it is likely that any
improvements that are present are the result of other influences. For example, levels of
development tend to have an increased impact on levels of equality.
Given the slow (or complete absence of) improvements in nearly all sectors, it is
clear that treaties are not fulfilling their intended purposes of creating gender equality on
both a domestic and an international scale. If states are signing women’s rights treaties
and not fulfilling the duties and obligations set forth within them, then there are clearly
alternative reasons for doing so. This means women still have a long road ahead of
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them not only to create institutions that are structured to uphold and enforce their rights,
but also indicates significant progress will be well delayed as well. Treaties are being
signed and organizations are being formed under the disguise of helping women, and
yet women around the world are not reaping the benefits. Abuses are being covered up
by false words and promises of a more equal future, but not action is taking place.
These veils of promises are likely to continue allowing the cycles of oppression and
abuse based on gender, and are only making it harder to combat the underlying
institutional issues at hand. Without a system that not only encourages, but enforces
treaty obligations and a solid system for reporting both abuses and improvements, we
cannot expect to see results.
Lastly, it is important to note that data was collected solely based on a standard
of whether a state has ratified CEDAW, and other women’s rights treaties have not
been directly taken into account during this analysis. Some of the states included in this
study may have signed multiple other regional or UN declarations or treaties on
women’s rights or human rights in the years prior, or since ratification of CEDAW. How
that has affected a state's ratings and improvements is not included in this analysis, but
given the lack of improvements overall up to the present day, it may be assumed that
ratification of additional treaties has done little to encourage additional change.
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